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Abstract 
Buyouts became a hot topic in the financial academia after billions of euros have been invested 
by the private equity industry over the past decade. Are these deals economically desirable? 
Acknowledging the need to adjust operating returns by the new risk profile of target firms after 
the buyout (i.e. the new cost of capital), this study provides new empirical evidence on whether 
and how buyouts create value in portfolio companies. Using a sample of 159 pan-European deals, 
we found no evidence of higher value creation in buyouts after adjusting for industry effects. 
Furthermore, we applied a multivariate analysis to study the determinants of value creation and 
found that, apart from sales growth and the outsourcing of intermediate goods and services, the 
majority of theoretical drivers have weak explanatory power or actually fail to explain the 
behaviour of risk adjust returns. Overall, our findings support the theory that private equity 
investments introduce an entrepreneurial and growth mid-set, reflected in higher pace of growth 
and capex levels, while value may be created by reducing labour intensity through higher 
outsourcing. In the end, our results highlighted the need for further investigation of the value 
creation process in the more recent waves of deals. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Private Equity Investment: why does it matter? 
Buyouts may exert a significant impact in the whole economy. Whenever a firm goes 
private in a buyout it sparks inevitable impacts (positive or negative) on the wealth of the 
pre and post-buyout shareholders, creditors, top executives, employees and governments. 
Moreover, behind the overall private equity (“PE”) market are institutional investors 
(pension funds, endowments, funds of funds or insurance companies) supplying the 
capital invested in portfolio companies, collecting thereafter the returns that will fund 
their long-term liabilities such as insurance claims or employees’ pensions.  
The increasing role of the PE market in the economy has caught the attention of 
regulators, media and trade unions. Among others, PE firms have been criticized for asset 
stripping and asset flipping (e.g., Wright et al., 2009, Guo et al., 2011); negative 
restructuring effects on employment and employees’ remuneration (e.g., Wright et al., 
2012); the use of excessive leverage and potential contribution for systemic risk, 
especially after the 2007-08 financial crisis (e.g., Wilson et al., 2012); short-term 
performance horizon (e.g., Wilson et al, 2012) or offshore holding companies that reduce 
significantly tax bills (e.g., Wright et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the debate has been also extended to the value creation vs. value 
redistribution hypotheses. In fact, many authors argue that PE investments are just a 
mechanism of value expropriation rather than value creation. 
First, some authors argue that the high leverage usually associated to PE deals provides 
significant tax shields, meaning a value transfer from taxpayers (Guo et al., 2011). In 
some cases, the tax savings implied by the incremental interest deductions can more than 
account for the total stockholder premium paid in the buyout (Smith, 1990). Still, even if 
the corporate tax deductions are substantial, the net effect of leveraged buyouts on the 
revenues of the Public Treasury remains unclear (Smith, 1990). According to this author, 
the premium paid to stockholders and the interest paid to debt holders may generate tax 
revenues from capital gains and interest income, respectively. Also, the sale of assets with 
a higher value elsewhere (divestments of peripheral units are typical restructuring 
measures in PE buyouts) may lead to capital gains taxes at the corporate level as well. 
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Furthermore, the increase in management efficiency resulting from the new corporate 
ownership structure may lead to higher taxable corporate income. 
Second, other studies suggest that private equity investors may use debt to pay special 
dividends for themselves which constitutes an effective expropriation from other 
shareholders (e.g. Tykvová, T. and Borell, M., 2012).  
Third, PE investors may destroy the firm's implicit contracts with its employees (layoffs, 
salary cuts, etc.) which might be seen as value expropriation as well. Phan and Hill (1995) 
argue that employees are negatively impacted by the increasing leverage on the acquiring 
company if, for instance, it reduces the likelihood to fund their pension plans. More 
important, the downsizings usually associated to these deals bring employee layoffs while 
efficiency programmes may imply wage reductions. The authors go even further to claim 
that leveraged buyouts might be a mechanism of enriching senior managers (with 
substantially higher equity positions) at the expense of other employees. Overall, the 
empirical evidence on this matter is mixed and is reviewed later in this study. 
Lastly, a substantial part of the PE investors’ gains may be simply wealth transfers from 
bondholders and other creditors when their bonds/loans are left outstanding in the new 
company with a riskier profile (Jensen, M., 1989). However, the author recalls that 
convertible bonds and preferred stockholders usually gain a significant amount in such 
transactions while there is no clear evidence that bondholders lose on average. On this 
matter, we highlight the empirical work of Cook et al. (1992) which studied the impact 
of 29 MBOs announced in the US during 1981-1989 on the value of the firms' outstanding 
non-convertible bonds and found bondholder wealth losses of about 3% associated with 
the announcement of the buyout, consistent with previous studies of Asquith and Wizman 
(1990) and Warga and Welch (1991) but in conflict with the findings provided by Marais 
et al. (1989). On the other hand, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) argue that even if bond prices 
might decrease with the higher financial risk, stockholder gains in going private 
transactions greatly exceed potential losses suffered by bondholders. In the end, we tend 
to agree with the argument that any expropriation of this kind should be relativized given 
the wide assortment of mechanisms to protect debt holders (e.g. poison puts and other 
covenants) in the event of substantial restructuring of portfolio companies (Jensen, M., 
1989).  
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In short, a renewed emphasis has been placed on the value creation process of PE deals, 
calling for further empirical work on this topic. 
1.2 Our Contribution 
This study sheds new lights on the value created for the claimholders in portfolio 
companies (both equity holders and debt holders) and follows the same spirit of 
Bergström et al. (2007) in the sense that, from an aggregated societal perspective, value 
creation is mainly achieved through operating improvements in portfolio companies. In 
this regard, we recall that empirical evidence from 206 buyouts in Europe during 1999-
2005 suggests that roughly two thirds of the value captured by PE investors comes from 
operating improvements at portfolio companies, being much more important than 
financial engineering (Achleitner et al., 2010), consistent Heel and Kehoe (2005). 
Using recent statistical data from pan-European deals (buyouts concluded from 2006 to 
2011), our study examines the following research questions: (1) Does the private equity 
investment creates value in the acquired companies? and (2) What are the main 
determinants and their impact on the buyouts value creation process?  
Therefore, this study brings three important contributions. 
First, we fill in the actual research gap on buyouts value creation. Indeed, to the best of 
our knowledge, there is no “true study of value creation” in portfolio companies. While 
there is vast empirical evidence on post-buyout operating performance (check literature 
review in section 2) these studies have not taken into account the potential change in the 
capital structure of portfolio companies. In our view, this is of utmost importance when 
the end result of a buyout might be a dramatic change in their risk profile (e.g., Cook et 
al. 1992). As such, whether portfolio companies outperform or underperform a given 
benchmark is not sufficient to conclude on the value creation of these deals if their 
operating returns are not properly adjusted by the cost of capital. Hence, our findings 
derive from risk adjusted returns. 
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Second, we bring a fresh update on the new wave of private equity deals in Europe. We 
found that the academic discussion of portfolio companies’ performance is still far away 
from a conclusive stance with mixed results depending on the different waves of deals 
and with the studies essentially focused in the US and UK markets. As such, it is timely 
to provide systematic evidence on the most recent wave of deals in Continental Europe 
and to take into account a different macro and microeconomic context. As Berg and 
Gottschalg (2005) pointed out “these (recent deals) may differ substantially from early 
transactions in their strategic logic and value generation mechanisms, so that earlier 
studies may be less suitable to explain them”. 
Third, no conclusive research has been done on the variables explaining the relative 
performance of buyouts. Moreover, given the complex process through which different 
drivers interact with each other, we believe it is paramount to expand the scope of early 
studies to models that consider a multivariate analysis. 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
background in light of the existing literature along with the research hypotheses. Chapter 
3 describes the methodological strategy, chapter 4 presents the sample, chapter 5 presents 
the results and chapter 6 concludes. 
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2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Private Equity and Buyouts 
Private Equity Buyouts are a common form of corporate restructuring and occur whenever 
a specialized investment vehicle (the private equity fund or limited partnership) acquires 
a controlling stake in a company or division for a given period of time. PE funds are run 
by highly skilled professionals (the general partners) who raise the capital from 
institutional investors (the limited partners). 
These PE buyouts typically leave a significant equity ownership in the hands of the 
management teams (many studies report over 20% stakes; e.g., Holthausen and Larcker 
(1996)) and are often financed with a significant amount of debt using the assets / cash 
flows of the target firm as collateral (the leveraged buyouts). 
The main rationale of PE investors is to profit by exploring opportunities for both cost 
efficiencies and growth in portfolio companies thanks to their broad network of contacts, 
strong management expertise and monitoring skills of general partners. They assume an 
active role in monitoring the business of portfolio companies which usually includes a 
seat on the board of directors and the specification of several restrictions on the 
management behaviour. Likewise, debt providers in leveraged buyouts will closely watch 
the performance and financial health of portfolio companies, designing and monitoring 
several debt covenants (Wright et al., 2009).  
According to Wright et al. (1994) there are three key features that characterize a buyout: 
“First, the full or partial transfer of a firm’s assets, embodied in operational business 
units, to a new company established for the purpose of running them; second, 
comparatively high reliance on debt - of one form or another - in the financial structure 
of the new company; allowing thirdly, the relative concentration of equity ownership, 
with managers and some participating institutions typically holding substantial voting 
blocks.” Wright et al. (1994). 
Lastly, it is worth noting that, contrarily to the more generic form of takeovers, buyouts 
are not motivated by synergies. Indeed, PE firms manage their portfolio companies 
independently from one another, with the ultimate goal of increasing the value of the 
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target company as a stand-alone entity significantly above the acquiring price (Berg and 
Gottschalg, 2005). In this sense, in the rest of this chapter we introduce and explore the 
issue of value creation, discussing the mechanisms through which PE firms are expected 
to increase the value of their target companies. 
Figure 1 summarizes this introductory discussion illustrating the typical structure of a 
leveraged buyout. 
Figure 1 – The typical Structure of a Leveraged Buyout 
 
 
2.2 A Theoretical Framework to Study the Buyouts Value Creation 
Prior research has relied mostly on the agency theory as the major theoretical lever of 
value creation in buyouts. Indeed, following Jensen (1989) seminal contribution, PE-
backed buyouts have been commonly seen as a superior governance mechanism (the 
“Jensen’s hypothesis”) providing the necessary changes in governance and incentive 
structures either through (1) a substantial management ownership1, (2) the close 
                                                          
1 For instance, DeAngelo and DeAgelo (1987), Kaplan (1989), Easterwood et al. (1989), Holthausen and 
Larcker (1996)). 
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monitoring of management behaviour2 or (3) the use of high financial leverage3 as a 
discipline device to avoid the waste of corporate resources in projects with negative net 
present value. 
Under this perspective, the very nature of buyouts impose a governance model that results 
in superior performance of target firms (e.g., Scellato and Ughetto, 2013) with the most 
common candidates being established firms with a resilient revenue stream (more likely 
to support the high debt service under economic downturns), high free cash flow available 
and visible management entrenchment with strong potential to remove inefficiencies 
caused by the separation of ownership and management control (e.g., Anders 1992).   
In another perspective, PE backed buyouts have been recently associated to 
entrepreneurial opportunities whereby the PE investment is the ultimate catalyst to boost 
top line growth, promote organizational changes and bring strategic innovations (Berg 
and Gottschalg, 2005). On this topic, Kester and Luehrman (1995) argue that the figure 
of the general partner is key to promote strategic changes and support better management 
decisions thanks to their financial and strategic expertise (commonly known as “the 
parenting advantage”). 
The alleged superior economic performance resulting either from the agency theory or 
the parenting advantage has been empirically tested in terms of higher operating 
profitability and/or productivity, based on different accounting measures (e.g., Kaplan 
(1989), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Guo et al. 
(2011)).  
In addition, significant empirical research has been done on the possible drivers of 
superior performance, such as cost cuttings (employment, wages, overheads, etc.), the 
strict control of capital requirements (Capex, R&D, inventories, etc.), the removal of 
managerial inefficiencies (e.g. replacement of the CEO, less bureaucratic structures) and 
strategic changes (e.g., disposal of non-core divisions, new product developments, etc.) 
                                                          
2 For instance, DeAngelo and DeAgelo (1987), Jensen (1989), Baker and Wruck (1989), Anders (1992), 
Kester and Luehrman, (1995). 
3 For instance, DeAngelo and DeAgelo (1987), Jensen (1989), Magowan (1989), Kester and Luehrman, 
(1995). 
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All in all, the value creation at portfolio companies is a complex process whereby 
different determinants work together with a significant level of interdependence. As 
illustrated in figure 2, for the sake of simplicity and to expose the theoretical and empirical 
background on buyouts’ value creation, we followed a conceptual framework similar to 
the one presented by Berg and Gottschalg (2005), distinguishing between primary drivers 
(the ones with a direct bottom line effect through operating improvements or strategic 
adjustments) and secondary drivers (which do not have a visible impact on financial 
metrics but support and enhance the effects of primary levers).  
Figure 2 – Conceptual framework of buyouts value creation 
 
2.3 Do Buyouts lead to superior operating performance? 
The first wave of buyouts (1980s): Empirical evidence from the US and UK 
Empirical studies from the first wave of PE buyouts in the US and UK seem to gather 
consensus that, on average, there is a positive and statistically improvement of the 
operating performance of portfolio companies in the years subsequent to the 
announcement of the buyout (most studies focused on the first 2 or 3 years).  
For instance, Kaplan (1989) examined the performance of 48 large MBOs completed in 
the US during the 1980-86 period and found that, 3 years after the buyout, portfolio 
companies’ EBITDA and other cash flow measures outperformed their industry 
counterparts. These findings are consistent with identical studies (Bruton et al. (2002), 
Bull (1989), Ofek (1994), Opler (1992), Singh (1990), Smart and Waldfogel (1994)).  
Superior Economic 
Performance
Higher Profitability Higher Productivity
Removing Managerial 
Inefficiencies
Strategic ChangesCost Cuttings
Reducing Capital 
Requirements
Primary Drivers
Parenting Advantage Debt Discipline Incentives Alignment Monitoring and Control
Secondary Drivers
 9 
 
By the same token, Holthausen and Larcker (1996) examined the performance of a sample 
of 90 reverse LBOs and found that the accounting performance is significantly better than 
their industries at the time of the IPO and for at least the subsequent four years, consistent 
with a similar study on reverse LBOs by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990). 
Using plant level data, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) studied a broad sample of 1,100 
US manufacturing firms involved in LBOs during the 1981-86 period and reported 
significantly higher productivity gains (about 14%, measured by a total factor 
productivity analysis at the plant level) when compared to other plants in the same 
industry. According to these authors, productivity gains are mostly explained by lower 
input growth rather than higher output growth.  
Similarly, UK evidence from the 1980s also suggests that buyouts improve significantly 
the financial performance of target firms (Wright, Thomson and Robbie (1992); Wright, 
Wilson and Robbie (1997)). 
The subsequent wave(s) of buyouts (1990s and 2000s): Empirical evidence from the US 
and UK 
Contrarily to the 1980s findings, the evidence of the more recent wave(s) is mixed with 
no clear evidence of superior economic performance in the years following the buyout.  
Guo et al. (2011) studied 192 LBOs completed in the US during 1990-2006 and reported 
operating gains substantially smaller than those found in the 1980s studies (depending on 
the selected indicator, the median performance was not always significantly different 
from the control group). Moreover, these authors found that LBOs in this period appear 
to use less leverage than their predecessors from the 1980s. 
Other studies of the US buyout market show either deterioration of post-buyout 
performance or non-conclusive findings of improvements (Jelic and Wright (2011), Weir 
and Laing (1998), Weir et al. (2012)). 
Empirical research of buyouts in the UK seems to support the “Jensen’s hypothesis”. 
Based on company-level data, Amess (2002, 2003) presented evidence from a panel of 
78 UK manufacturing firms engaged in MBOs during 1986-97 and show significant 
operating improvements in the years following the buyout, reporting positive productivity 
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effects (using an augmented production function approach) and substantial technical 
efficiency gains (using a stochastic production frontier approach).  The findings of Amess 
(2002, 2003) were subsequently corroborated by a broader study of 36,000 manufacturing 
plants in the UK (Harris et al., 2005) and are consistent with the results of Cressy et al. 
(2007) which found that over the first 3 post-buyout years the companies backed by PE 
firms have outperformed comparable non-buyout companies. Likewise, a more recent 
study of thousands of PE-backed buyouts during 1995-2010 reported superior 
profitability and growth of portfolio companies in the period before and during the recent 
global recession, relative to a benchmark of matching firms (Wilson et al., 2012).  
Empirical evidence from Continental Europe 
Existing studies have been mostly focused in the US and UK markets with little evidence 
for PE buyouts in Continental Europe.  
To the best of our knowledge, the study of Scellato and Ughetto (2013) is the only one 
comprising pan-European deals4. The authors used a sample of 241 private-to-private 
buyouts completed between 1997 and 2004 and a control group of non-buyouts to explore 
the effects on size, profitability and productivity. While their results suggest a positive 
impact on growth measures (assets and employment), there is no clear evidence of 
productivity gains and the authors estimate lower operating profitability for buyout firms 
with respect to the control group after 3 years upon completion of the deal. 
Other studies have been made in specific countries. In France, Desbrières and Schatt 
(2002) found that LBOs led to short-term reductions in the abnormal return on invested 
capital and a significant reduction in margin ratios which contrasts with the later results 
of Boucly et al. (2011) that show a large and statistically significant increase in portfolio 
companies’ profitability after the LBO using broad sample of 839 deals for the 1994-2004 
period.  
                                                          
4 However, we note that Acharya et al. (2009) used proprietary data to study 395 buyouts in Europe and 
found higher abnormal performance at the equity level which the authors associate with a stronger 
operating improvements (at firm level) in all operating measures relative to quoted peers. 
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Lastly, Bergström et al. (2007) shown that buyouts in Sweden outperformed non-buyout 
comparable firms while Vinten (2007) provided evidence of relative underperformance 
of portfolio companies in Denmark. 
*** 
In the end, existing research suggests that the study of operating improvements caused by 
PE buyouts in Continental Europe lacks further empirical work, especially when the 
results of the most wide-ranging study of Scellato and Ughetto (2013) are not consistent 
with the average results from the US and UK. Moreover, we found no study dealing with 
risk adjusted operating returns which, we believe, is crucial to test any value creation. As 
such, we advance with the following research hypothesis. 
H1: PE-backed buyouts show higher risk adjusted performance in comparison to non-
buyouts. 
 
2.4 The potential determinants of buyouts’ value creation 
 
2.4.1 Do Buyouts improve profitability through cost savings?  
Theoretical discussions report that jobs and salary cuts are one of the most common 
instruments to improve profitability (e.g., Butler (2011), Easterwood et al. (1989)). 
Indeed, it is undeniable that one of the most controversial discussions surrounding PE 
buyouts concerns the alleged negative consequences on employment and wages placing 
increasing pressure in the hands of policymakers. Looking at the empirical evidence, are 
there reasons to believe that PE investors expropriate value from the portfolio companies’ 
employees?  
Research from US buyouts during the 1980s is not conclusive. Kaplan (1989) reported a 
median change of 0.9% in employment levels for buyout companies (4.9% growth for a 
subsample of buyouts without large post-buyout divestitures) while Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990) and Opler (1992) found no relevant changes in employment. The 
study of reverse LBOs by Holthausen and Larcker (1996) also reported no evidence that 
the staffing levels of reverse-LBO firms are different from their industries either before 
or after the reverse LBO.  These results contrast with the study of Lichtenberg and Siegel 
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(1990) which found that labour tend to decline after the buyout relative to the industry 
average. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) have also suggested that LBOs are a production-
labour using and non-production-labour saving organizational innovation since the ratio 
of non-production labour costs declined sharply after the LBO while production worker 
wage rates increased. 
Evidence from the UK is not conclusive as well. Early studies suggested that layoffs 
happened mostly at the time of the ownership change which might be explained by the 
fact that UK buyouts in the 1980s were mainly focused in restructuring troubled 
companies, reflected in job savings in the longer run (Wright et al., 2009).  This line of 
reasoning finds support in the study of Cressy et al. (2007) which suggests that, to achieve 
efficiency gains, UK buyouts bring quick and significant job cuts in target companies 
during the first 4 years of the holding period (relative to the control group) but 
employment rises thereafter. As such, both studies provide some evidence that an initial 
period of rationalisation prepares ground for sustainable job creation in the future. Other 
studies in the UK claim that LBOs per se do not destroy jobs (Amess and Wright, 2007, 
2012) but report significantly lower wage growth vs non-LBOs in the same period (Amess 
and Wright, 2007).  In contrast, Jelic and Wright (2011) found a significant increase in 
employment following the buyouts whereas a survey with 148 usable questionnaires from 
Bacon et al. (2004) reported that buyouts resulted in higher employment, the adoption of 
new reward systems and higher staff involvement, in line with the resource based view 
and against the traditional cost reduction approach. 
The research carried with deals from Continental Europe does not support the view that 
buyouts affect negatively employment and/or wages. For instance, Scellato and Ughetto 
(2013) found that pan-European buyouts have a significant and positive impact in 
employment growth both in the short and mid run, consistent with empirical evidence on 
French deals (Boucly, 2011). 
Overall, the evidence of value creation through staff cost cuttings remains mixed and, 
once again, depends largely on the empirical studies carried using data from buyouts in 
the US and UK. As such, despite all the political and unions’ discussions, based on 
existing empirical studies we cannot conclude that buyouts do have a significant impact 
on employment and wages.  
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Following the theoretical and empirical discussions, we advance with the following 
hypotheses: 
H2: Higher labour force productivity exert a positive and significant impact in the 
economic performance of portfolio companies. 
H3: Reductions of the employees’ remuneration exert a positive and significant impact in 
the economic performance of portfolio companies. 
Beyond the cost with employees, many authors argue that PE firms bring a new culture 
of rationalization to portfolio companies which tighten their overall corporate spending 
(e.g., Magowan (1989), Anders (1992), Holthausen and Larcker (1996)).  
The promotion of a less bureaucratic organizational structure with reduced central 
overheads is one of the most common measures (e.g., Easterwood et al., 1989). Bruton et 
al. (1989) found that the ratio of SG&A to sales in portfolio companies declined 
significantly during the holding period, consistent with the evidence that a significant 
fraction of productivity gains in M&A comes from reductions in central office overheads 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (2008). 
Other cost items were also examined in empirical studies, especially at the gross margin 
level (e.g., Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), Harris et al. (2005)). For instance, Harris 
et al. (2005) suggest that portfolio companies achieved higher operating performance by 
lowering the labour intensity of production through the outsourcing of intermediate goods 
and materials.  
For publicly listed companies, the cost savings from going private may also include the 
salaries and overheads for stockholder relations departments, as well as the management 
time spent dealing with public stockholders, financial analysts and the financial press 
(e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1987), Magowan (1989)). 
Consequently, we hypothesize that other cost cuttings may explain part of the change in 
the economic performance of portfolio firms. 
H4: Reductions of overheads costs exert a positive and significant impact in the economic 
performance of portfolio companies. 
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H5: Reductions of intermediate consumption (higher industrial outsourcing) exert a 
positive and significant impact in the economic performance of portfolio companies. 
 
2.4.2 Do Buyouts optimize Investment Requirements? 
Along with operational cost savings, optimization programmes may seek to improve the 
productivity of the capital employed. For instance, portfolio companies may be 
incentivized to reduce their Capex (e.g., Anders (1992), Butler (2001)), to make better 
use of their assets (e.g., Bull 1989) or to reallocate funds from low value added industrial 
spending to commercial and marketing campaigns (Anders, 1992).  
Early evidence from buyouts in the US (1980s) suggested that portfolio companies 
reduced their Capex relative to the pre-buyout years and the respective control groups 
(e.g., Kaplan (1989), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), Opler (1992)). Opposite results 
were found by Boucly et al. (2011) in French PE buyouts which reported higher Capex 
growth vs. non PE-backed firms.  
Some authors argue that R&D investments might be an additional source of savings as 
many companies were found to put their R&D budgets under more scrutiny (e.g., Butler, 
2001) after the buyout. However, we are still lacking an adequate level of empirical 
research to draw firm conclusions. In one of the few studies on this matter, Long and 
Ravenscraft (1993) found a large and significant cut of R&D intensity (measured by 
R&D/sales) in 72 LBOs in the US, which the authors related to the discipline effect of 
high financial leverage. Nevertheless, these significant cutbacks in R&D spending were 
found to have no statistically effect on operating performance.  
With contrary findings, a broader study carried by Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) on 1,100 
LBOs in the US for the same period (1980s) suggested that the R&D intensity of firms 
involved in LBOs increased substantially.  
In our view, the findings of Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) seem to be more consistent 
with the entrepreneurial and growth mind-set introduced by the PE investors or at least 
that post-buyout companies withdraw resources from those low profitable projects not 
likely to be turnaround which normally implies exiting uncertain R&D projects. As such, 
rather than a straightforward spending cut, the main question mark seems to be whether 
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strategic resources (capital and management time) are taken apart from negative net 
present value projects and allocated into value creative projects (Easterwood et al., 1989) 
Lastly, some authors claimed for a long time that PE investors improved capital 
productivity ratios a portfolio companies through a better working capital management 
(e.g., Baker and Wruck (1989), Kester and Luehrman (1995)). For instance, the case study 
of Scott’s LBO in the US described the better planning of the timing and cash 
management, the pressure to negotiate with suppliers to obtain more favourable terms on 
payments and inventories schedules (Baker and Wruck, 1989). Several empirical studies 
on the first wave of buyouts (in the US and UK) seem to support this hypothesis (e.g., 
Kitching (1989), Singh (1990), Wright et al. (1992)) but more recent deals do not gather 
the same consensus. For instance, while Wilson et al. (2012) found that PE-backed 
buyouts in the UK experienced improved working capital management during the recent 
global recession, Guo et al. (2011) examined US buyouts over the 1990-2006 period and 
found no significant results from the post-buyout change in the net working capital to 
sales ratio. 
Overall, we believe the buyout effects on investment strategies is still not fully understood 
with the few studies being highly concentrated in the US and UK and showing no 
conclusive results. We advance with the following research hypotheses. 
H6: Reductions of capital expenditure levels exert a positive and significant impact in the 
economic performance of portfolio companies. 
H7: Reductions of working capital levels exert a positive and significant impact in the 
economic performance of portfolio companies. 
 
2.4.3 Do Buyouts mitigate Agency Costs? Evidence of the debt discipline effect 
According to our conceptual framework (adapted from Berg and Gottschalg, 2005), one 
of the mechanisms contributing to reduce agency risks is the effect of debt discipline 
which supports and enhances the positive impact of the primary drivers described 
previously (cost cuttings, better asset utilisation, etc.).  
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Several authors stressed the key role of debt as a vehicle to limit the waste of free cash 
flow by putting managers under pressure to service debt payments and therefore reducing 
managers’ discretion over corporate spending (e.g., Baker and Wruck (1989), DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1987), Jensen (1986, 1989), Magowan (1989)). In this sense, financial 
leverage works as a monitoring and incentive device, especially in slow-growing or 
shrinking firms with high free cash flow available (Jensen, 1989) and when more 
restrictive and short-term debt is issued (e.g., Cotter and Peck (2001), Vinten (2007)). 
Kester and Luerhman (1995), for instance, suggest that equity and debt are not merely 
different types of financial claims since the capital structure acts as real instrument of 
governance. As such, LBOs may play a key role in enhancing firm value through the 
implementation of the right combination of debt and equity. 
“By its very nature, debt constitutes a fairly rigid, rules-based approach to 
governance...In general, a business that has easily redeploy able assets and that faces 
relatively few good growth opportunities will be better governed by the simple, low-cost, 
rules-based regime provided by debt default. By contrast, businesses with highly 
attractive growth opportunities or a need for functionally specific assets (dedicated to a 
particular customer or supplier, locationally fixed, or dependent on specific human 
capital, for example) will be better governed by a regime dominated by equity. Such 
businesses typically require substantial managerial discretion and administrative 
flexibility. But businesses change over time and so, too, should the type of governance 
they employ".” Kester and Luerhman (1995) 
It is worth noting that another positive effect of debt has been associated to “outsourced 
governance” coming from banks and bondholders which have the right incentives to 
monitor and control the management behaviour (Berg and Gottschalg, 2005) while debt 
covenants establish objective constraints for the management’s discretionary power (e.g., 
Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). 
Although we found empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that debt has a 
discipline effect on managers (e.g., Bull (1989), Cotter and Peck (2001), Guo et al. (2011), 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), Tykvová and Borell (2012)) other studies reported 
no meaningful relation between changes in financial leverage and economic performance 
(e.g., Bergström et al. (2007), Holthausen and Larcker (1996), Thomson et al. (1992), 
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Vinten (2007)) and no relationship between the ratio of undistributed cash flow to equity 
value and the decision of going private or the premium paid to stockholders of going 
private firms (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989).  
H8: Higher financial leverage leads to a positive and significant impact in the economic 
performance of portfolio companies. 
 
2.4.4 Do Buyouts benefit from the Parenting Advantage? 
Like a specific business may benefit from being part of a larger corporation, the PE 
specialist per se may create value in portfolio companies of its “family” (Berg and 
Gottschalg, 2005) 
Value creation has been associated to the PE specialist in several ways. First, they are 
able to share unique financial and management expertise (e.g., Anders, 1992). Second, 
PE investors have typically a time horizon that is long enough to restructure 
underperforming companies and short enough to give management teams the right 
incentive devices. This contrasts with companies not owned by PE investors where the 
time horizon is often too short or too long (Bergström et al., 2007). Third, PE firms can 
add value by offering a valuable network of contacts to the buyout company, including 
headhunting, finding the right business partner or raising funds thanks to their strong 
reputation in capital markets (Bergström et al. (2007), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1987), 
Kester and Luehrman (1995)). 
“More so than the other directors, the lead representative serves as the CEO's sounding 
board on both day-to-day operations and long-term decisions. In addition to 
contributing an understanding of what's involved in running a company, this individual 
is expected to listen, ask questions, react to ideas, and suggest alternative ways to 
address problems and opportunities.... (PE investors) also assumes primary 
responsibility for maintaining relationships with banks and subordinated lenders, and it 
helps obtain additional capital as needed for strategic investments. (…) LBOs, instead 
of just making management pressured to sell assets and quickly pay debt, may be the 
right driver to search for good new investment opportunities in their industry.” Kester 
and Luehrman (1995) 
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According to this view, different investors’ characteristics will likely impact the 
performance of the target firms (Scellato and Ughetto, 2013).  
Empirical studies have examined the impact of different dimensions of the alleged 
parenting advantage. For instance, more experienced investors may have higher 
likelihood to create value in portfolio companies due to their broader knowledge of 
different industries, previous background on restructuring businesses and wider network 
of contacts (Scellato and Ughetto, 2013). Previous research suggested that PE firms 
experience leads to higher levels of growth at the portfolio companies (Meuleman et al., 
2009) and lower bankruptcy risk (Tykvová and Borell, 2012).  
A common proxy to measure experience is the size of the PE firm’s portfolio (Scellato 
and Ughetto, 2013). However, note that since large portfolios typically mean lower time 
available to advise each portfolio company (Scellato and Ughetto, 2013) this may also 
work negatively the prospects of portfolio companies (e.g. Cumming & Johan, 2007). As 
such, we advance with the following hypothesis: 
H9: The larger the PE firm’s portfolio, the higher the economic performance of portfolio 
companies. 
It has also been studied the impact of investor’s affiliation on firm’s performance. In this 
respect, some authors suggest that independent PE firms are relatively more concerned in 
building a respectable track record of successful exits to present in their subsequent 
fundraisings (Scellato and Ughetto, 2013). Ceteris paribus, this should have a positive 
impact in economic performance of portfolio companies. 
H10: Independent PE firms exert a positive and significant impact in the economic 
performance of portfolio companies.  
Furthermore, in syndicated PE deals, many PE investors share the ownership of portfolio 
companies. The main idea behind the syndicated deals is to come up with additional 
resources and risk sharing relative to stand-alone investors (Scellato and Ughetto, 2013). 
Such complementary capabilities may result in superior economic performance at firm 
level (Cumming and Walz, 2010). On the other hand, the co-existence of different 
investors may induce to moral hazard, free-riding and agency problems (e.g. Scellato and 
Ughetto (2013), Tykvová and Borell (2012)). 
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H11: Syndicated deals exert a positive and significant impact in the economic 
performance of portfolio companies 
Lastly, some authors argue that the geographical proximity between investors and 
portfolio companies has a higher likelihood of superior performance, essentially due to 
the costs and effectiveness in providing monitoring and advice to portfolio companies as 
well as addressing potential asymmetric information or agency problems (Scellato and 
Ughetto, 2013). 
H12: Domestic PE investments exert a positive and significant impact in the economic 
performance of portfolio companies. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Assessing the Buyouts Value Creation 
To evaluate the value creation at portfolio companies we measured the statistical 
significance of the risk-adjusted returns over a period of 3 years after deal completion and 
against a sample of comparable firms. A Wilcoxon signed rank test was used to determine 
the statistical significance of the economic performance, in line with the majority of 
similar studies (e.g., Kaplan (1989), Holthausen and Larcker (1996), Guo et al. (2011)). 
The big advantage to other methods (e.g. t-test) is that normality assumptions are not 
required under this non-parametric statistical test.  
Furthermore, following previous studies (e.g., Kaplan (1989), Cressy et al. (2007), 
Scellato and Ughetto (2013)), we considered a time-window extending from one year 
before the buyout to three years after the deal as a reasonable period to experience tangible 
effects in the underlying performance of targets. 
Overall, our approach stems from the idea that a profitability analysis per se is not 
sufficient to prove that the PE buyout has created value. As such, we use an economic 
value added approach, measuring for both the portfolio companies and the control group, 
the difference between the returns on invested capital (ROIC) and the respective weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) which we define as the “Economic Return” (“ER”).  
ER = ROIC - WACC 
Note that our measure of the cost of capital inevitably implied important assumptions. 
First, the assumptions for the capital structure. For buyout companies, we used the 
structure implemented at the time of the buyout which we have assumed constant until 
t+3. Although we acknowledge this may be a rather strong assumption, there is no 
conclusive evidence that financial leverage is significantly reduced in the years following 
the buyout5. Furthermore, for the year before the buyout (t-1) we assumed the implied 
                                                          
5 For instance, Kaplan (1991) found that firms acquired in LBOs over 1979-86 and that remained privately-
owned at the end of 1989 had leverage ratios comparable to those at the time the LBO was completed. 
Furthermore, in a more recent study, Cohn, Mills and Towery (2013) found that firms dot not reduce 
leverage after LBOs, even if they generate excess cash flows. These authors suggest that “an assumption 
that debt remains at its level immediately after the buyout for at least several years is justified.” 
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equity value from the deal discounted for a typical acquisition premium: we used a 26% 
deal premium based on the average premium paid on 225 institutional buyouts carried in 
the E.U. with public companies during the 2000-2011 period6. Lastly, the capital structure 
of the control group was based on the historical market values of equity and debt. 
Second, the cost of equity assumptions. We used the capital asset pricing model 
framework assuming (1) a standard risk free rate of 3%7 (2) a standard equity risk 
premium of 6%8, (3) and for the beta assumptions we considered the median asset beta 
of the corresponding sector (i.e. the selected peer group for each buyout company) 
computed through a 2-year historical regression (using weekly returns and the major 
domestic index of each stock) and the “Bloomberg adjustment”9. Thereafter we have re-
leveraged the asset beta using the capital structure of the buyout. Note that for each 
company of the peer group we use directly the adjusted betas from the historical 
regression. Lastly, (4) the cost of equity for the buyout companies includes a standard 4% 
illiquidity premium10.  
Third, we computed the proportion of net interest payments over the net debt to get the 
best proxy for the cost of debt. Although we acknowledge such an accounting measure 
may differ in some cases for the real return required by debt holders we believe that on 
average this should be an objective and unbiased estimate for a relatively wide sample 
of our study. Furthermore, for the sake of preserving the economic equilibrium we have 
set the cost of debt to be no higher than the cost of equity. 
Lastly, for the income tax rate we assumed the effective tax rate. 
 
                                                          
6 Based on the Zephyr database (from Bureau Van Dijk’s) and taking into account the difference between 
the equity deal value and the closing share price at the rumour date.  
7 We considered 3% as a normalized riskless return to invest in European equities, consistent with the 
historical average of the Germany’s 10-year sovereign bonds over the past 15 years. We considered the 
Germany’s sovereign bonds (AAA rating) as a reasonable proxy of a risk-free investment in this region. 
8 Widely used from industry practitioners and consistent with the historical average spread between the 
returns of the S&P 500 and the US sovereign bonds over the 1928-2014 period. 
9 Adjusted beta = 0.67 (Raw Beta) + 0.33 (1.00). The raw beta is modified by the assumption that a 
security's true beta will move towards the market average over time. 
10 Using data from 1984-2004, Venture Economics estimated that the returns to venture capital investors 
have been ~ 4% higher than the returns on traded stocks. As such, we may attribute this difference to 
illiquidity and add it on as the “illiquidity premium” for private companies. 
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3.2 Assessing the Determinants of Value Creation 
To assess the determinants of value creation we have run OLS regressions to explain the 
relative change in the economic return of portfolio companies using several explanatory 
variables (check table 1 below).  
Our regression analysis includes two models. Model I uses industry adjusted variables 
(i.e., each variable adjusted by the median change in the respective control sample’s 
variable) while Model II considers non-adjusted variables (in this case we control industry 
effects with industry dummies). 
Note that only the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of sales did not come directly 
from the previous theoretical discussion. Still, we applied this variable in our regression 
to capture indirect effects of sales growth on profitability: mainly operating leverage gains 
but also other factors such as the increasing bargaining power with suppliers. 
Model I - Adjusted variables 
(1) ∆ERi = β1 + β2SalesCAGRi + β3Labouri + β4Wagei + β5Overheadsi + 
β6Intemediatei + β87Capexi + β8WKi + β9Leveragei + β10Portfolioi + 
β11Syndicationi + β12Countryi + β13Independenti +µi 
Model II - Raw variables with industry dummies 
(2) ∆ERi = β1 + β2SalesCAGRi + β3Labouri + β4Wagei + β5Overheadsi + 
β6Intemediatei + β87Capexi + β8WKi + β9Leveragei + β10Portfolioi + 
β11Syndicationi + β12Countryi + β13Independenti + ∑ βjIndustryj, i
7
j=1  + µi 
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Table 1 - Variables used in the multivariate analysis 
Variables Definition / Observations 
Dependent Variable 
∆ Economic Return 
Economic Return: ROIC (1) - WACC.  
(1) ROIC = EBIT (1- effective tax rate) / Invested Capital (2).  
(2) Invested Capital = Tangible Assets + Goodwill + Other Intangibles + Inventories 
+ Receivables + other current assets - Payables - other current liabilities 
Explanatory Variables - Primary Drivers 
Sales CAGR Compound annual growth rate of sales (t+3 vs t-1) 
Labour Productivity Sales per employee CAGR (t+3 vs t-1) 
Wage Cost per employee CAGR (t+3 vs t-1) 
∆ Overheads to Sales Change of the ratio: (Total Operating Costs - Cost of Sales) / Sales 
∆ Intermediate Costs to Sales Change of the ratio: (Sales - Value Added) / Sales 
∆ Working Capital 
Change of the ratio: (Inventories + Receivables + Other current assets – Payables – 
other current liabilities) / Sales 
∆ Capex Change of the ratio: Capex / Sales 
Explanatory Variables - Secondary Drivers 
∆ Leverage 
Change of the ratio: Net Debt (3) / EBITDA.  
(3) Net Debt = Long-term loans + short term loans - cash & equivalents 
Portfolio 
Logarithm of the number of companies in the lead investor's portfolio (in the year 
of the buyout).  
Syndication Dummy variable that equals one in case of a syndicated deal; 0 otherwise. 
Country 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund belongs to the country of the PE-backed 
company; 0 otherwise 
Independent 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the private equity fund is a private equity firm 
investing its own capital; 0 otherwise 
Industry  
Dummy variables to control for the industry effects (when variables used in the 
regression are not adjusted with medians from the control sample) 
Note: all changes relate to the year t+3 vs t-1 except for Net Debt to EBITDA where we use t+1 vs t-1 
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4. Sample and Data 
 
4.1 Buyouts sample 
Our sample consists of firms based on the E.U. that underwent buyouts between 2006-
11. Data on the buyouts was collected from the Bureau Van Dijk’s Zephyr and 
Mergermarket databases (two the most comprehensive commercial databases of deal 
information), extracting all completed transactions classified as “institutional buyout” and 
financed through “private equity” with a minimum percentage stake of 50%. The 
accounting data associated to the buyout companies was extracted from the Bureau Van 
Dijk’s Amadeus database.  
The sample excludes banks and other financial institutions as well as all holding 
companies (for all companies classified in the database as “holdings” we have run a 
manual web search to properly allocate them to their correct industry; those who were 
confirmed to be effectively “holdings” were removed from our sample). Lastly, we have 
also excluded all the companies with no reported equity deal value (this is a key variable 
to estimate the capital structure before and after the buyout).  
Our final sample consists of 159 buyouts after eliminating all companies with no available 
financials. The tables below show the breakdown of the sample by buyout year and sector.  
Table 2 – Buyouts breakdown by year 
Buyout 
Year 
% of 
Sample 
Observations  
2006 21% 33 
2007 22% 35 
2008 22% 35 
2009 11% 18 
2010 21% 33 
2011 3% 5 
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Table 3 – Buyouts breakdown by sector 
Sector 
% of 
Sample 
Observations  
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 24% 38 
Mining & Construction 6% 10 
Manufacturing 25% 39 
Transportation & Public Utilities 12% 19 
Wholesale Trade & Retail 14% 23 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 6% 10 
Services 13% 20 
 
As a remark, we associate less deals in our sample in 2009 to the massive drop of PE 
investment in that year (55% drop vs 2008 according to data compiled from the European 
Private Equity & Venture Capital Association) while only 3% of deals in 2011 is solely 
explained by the lack of financial data (for t+3, i.e. 2014) available at the time of this 
study.  
Lastly, over 70% of the sample comprise deals where the portfolio company is located in 
the same country of the PE firm while 60% of the companies were acquired by an 
independent PE firm. The majority of the sample comprise non-syndicated deals (81%). 
 
4.2 Control group sample 
The assessment of the impact of buyouts on the performance of PE-backed companies 
requires the identification of an appropriate control group to control for economy-wide 
and industry effects: this is especially important in our study which focuses on the 2006-
2011 period (highly impacted by years of economic crisis). As such, our industry adjusted 
change of economic performance equals the change of the economic return for the 
portfolio company minus the median change of the matched control sample over the same 
relevant period.  
Using a similar methodology to Kaplan (1989), the control group firms are those that 
have the same 3-digit SIC code of the buyout companies. Furthermore, we have limited 
the sample to listed companies with headquarters in the E.U. Lastly, we have eliminated 
all the companies classified as “holdings”. Like in the case of buyouts, accounting data 
was extracted from Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus database. 
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4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents a number of descriptive statistics for our buyouts sample (before industry 
adjustments) and table 5 outlines the variables adjusted by industry effects. 
Descriptive statistics in table 4 reveal a 2.7% median negative economic return on 
portfolio companies in the year before the buyout and show that, three years after the deal, 
the median economic return has further deteriorated to -5.3%. When adjusted for the 
peers’ performance (table 5), we observe a median change of -1.9% in economic returns. 
Still, this result should be taken with caution given the relatively high standard deviation 
(30.6%). 
We also highlight a considerable increase in the pace of growth of portfolio companies 
(+4.3% median sales CAGR) during the first three years after the buyout as shown in 
table 4. Moreover, in table 5 we observe that buyout companies were able to grow their 
sales while their industry counterparts have declined in this period (+6.9% median sales 
CAGR after adjusting for industry effects). It is worth mentioning, however, that sales 
growth statistics may reflect not only the organic performance but also the effects of 
external growth and the translation effect of foreign currency. 
Furthermore, table 4 shows some deterioration both of the ROIC and EBITDA margins 
of portfolio companies. This was already expected, given the challenging economic 
environment in our selected period. Note that when adjusted for industry effects, the 
median change in margins is +0.6% suggesting that the weaker operating performance is 
in effect a result of broad macro factors. 
Surprisingly, the cost of capital (WACC) and financial leverage (net debt / EBITDA 
ratios) were relatively unchanged in portfolio companies. As shown in table 5, even when 
adjusted for industry peers, the median value of Net Debt / EBITDA ratios show a mall 
increase between t-1 and t+1 (from -0.1x to 0.1x). 
The annual growth rate of the sales per employee three years after the buyout was positive 
both in raw statistics (+2.0% median and +4.6% average) and industry adjusted statistics 
(+0.5% median and +1.8% average). The annual growth of the cost per employee was 
also positive (+0.9% median and +2.4% average) but still slightly lower than the non-
buyout companies (-1.8% median CAGR and -0.6% average CAGR). 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics of our selected buyouts sample  
Variables Average Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Sales CAGR  4.8% 4.3% 16.2% -4.4% 10.4% 
EBITDA margin (t+3) 10.5% 9.0% 19.6% 2.9% 19.2% 
EBITDA margin (t-1) 11.9% 10.5% 14.8% 1.7% 18.9% 
ROIC (t+3) 10.3% 5.6% 25.2% -0.5% 16.2% 
ROIC (t-1) 13.0% 7.9% 24.4% 1.2% 22.6% 
WACC (t+3) 11.1% 11.1% 1.6% 10.1% 11.7% 
Ke (t+3) 12.1% 11.6% 1.9% 11.0% 12.6% 
Kd (t+3) 7.1% 7.3% 3.9% 3.9% 10.9% 
WACC (t-1) 10.8% 11.0% 2.0% 9.7% 11.9% 
Ke (t-1) 12.6% 11.8% 2.4% 11.1% 13.0% 
Kd (t-1) 7.5% 7.8% 3.9% 5.0% 11.0% 
Economic Return (t+3) -0.7% -5.3% 25.1% -11.9% 6.3% 
Economic Return (t-1) 2.2% -2.7% 24.3% -9.2% 10.7% 
Net Debt / EBITDA (t+1) 3.1x 0.4x 6.8x -0.4x 3.3x 
Net Debt / EBITDA (t-1) 2.2x 0.3x 5.4x -0.5x 3.1x 
Sales per Employee CAGR 4.6% 2.0% 14.8% -3.4% 7.2% 
Cost per Employee CAGR 2.4% 0.9% 9.3% -2.8% 5.1% 
Overheads / Sales (t+3) 60.6% 55.4% 34.5% 31.8% 87.3% 
Overheads / Sales (t-1) 56.1% 51.8% 32.1% 28.8% 86.6% 
Intermediate Costs / Sales (t+3) 68.8% 72.4% 27.7% 52.1% 100.0% 
Intermediate Costs / Sales (t-1) 67.1% 71.1% 30.4% 47.4% 100.0% 
Capex / Sales (t+3) 7.5% 2.6% 13.0% 0.7% 6.8% 
Capex / Sales (t-1) 11.2% 3.0% 20.3% 0.4% 10.0% 
WK / Sales (t+3) 52.2% 19.1% 90.0% 5.9% 52.4% 
WK / Sales (t-1) 52.7% 21.1% 94.8% 7.0% 47.3% 
 
Table 5 – Evolution of key variables adjusted by the respective peer group 
Variables Average Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Sales CAGR 8.2% 6.9% 18.1% -2.0% 18.3% 
∆ EBITDA margin -0.6% 0.6% 16.5% -7.8% 5.5% 
∆ Economic Return -1.7% -1.9% 30.6% -15.3% 9.0% 
Net Debt / EBITDA (t+1) 2.3x 0.1x 6.8x -1.2x 2.5x 
Net Debt / EBITDA (t-1) 1.6x -0.1x 5.3x -1.3x 2.2x 
Sales per Employee CAGR 1.8% 0.5% 16.2% -7.8% 6.0% 
Cost per Employee CAGR -0.6% -1.8% 10.1% -7.3% 3.7% 
∆ Overheads to Sales 2.3% 2.0% 25.1% -5.5% 11.7% 
∆ Intermediate Costs to Sales -10.3% -6.7% 75.9% -30.4% 10.4% 
∆ Capex to Sales -1.4% 0.9% 20.4% -3.5% 5.6% 
∆ WK to Sales 0.5% 1.5% 98.1% -18.6% 15.2% 
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Overall, there is considerable dispersion of observations for some variables, especially in 
the cases of ROIC (and consequently the economic returns), overheads, intermediate 
costs and working capital, reflected in a significant deviation between average and median 
values. In the cases of ROIC and working capital, this should be related to different 
business models (capital intensive vs capital light businesses) and possibly different 
acquisition policies (e.g. recognition of the goodwill in the ROIC computation). In the 
cases of overheads and intermediate costs, we note that both items are sensitive to 
subjective accounting criteria to define which items contribute for the “value added” and 
the “cost of sales” – these items typically show significant differences across sectors.  
In figure 3 we present a comparative view between buyouts and its peer group based on 
a set of key variables of economic performance.  
Figure 3 – Average values of key variables: Buyouts vs Peer Group 
 
Buyout companies tend to show higher margins and ROIC while their cost of capital is 
naturally higher (by definition, they embark a higher risk profile). The figure also 
illustrates well the outperformance in terms of sales growth and show the general decline 
of margins and ROIC.  
Table 6 presents industry adjusted statistics split by the buyout year. We highlight that 
those deals completed in 2006-08 show positive change in economic returns with inverse 
results for those deals carried over 2009-11. These results suggest a gradual deterioration 
of economic conditions throughout our selected period. 
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Table 6 – Industry adjusted statistics: breakdown by buyout year (median values) 
 
Lastly, table 7 present the breakdown of the descriptive statistics by sector. Looking at 
the change in economic returns, Transportation & Public Utilities (12% of total deals) 
stand out as the best performer while the deals in the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
sector (24% of our sample) show the worst performance.  
Table 7 – Industry adjusted statistics: breakdown by sector (median values) 
   
Buyout 
Year
∆ 
Economic 
Return
Sales
CAGR
∆ EBITDA 
margin
Net Debt / 
EBITDA
(t+1)
Net Debt / 
EBITDA
(t-1)
Sales to 
Employe
e CAGR
Cost per 
Employe
e CAGR
∆ 
Overheads 
to Sales
∆ Capex 
to Sales
∆ WK to 
Sales
2006 3.1% 8.0% -1.1% -0.1x -0.2x 4.6% -1.7% -4.3% 2.0% -10.2%
2007 1.3% 10.0% 2.3% 0.5x 0.8x 2.9% 2.7% 1.7% 1.4% 2.3%
2008 0.9% 8.8% 0.8% 0.0x 0.0x -0.6% -2.7% 3.9% 0.3% -4.7%
2009 -4.3% 2.0% 0.9% 0.2x -0.7x -7.1% -0.5% 8.2% 0.3% 9.9%
2010 -4.6% 6.1% -0.5% 0.0x 0.0x -2.9% -1.2% 2.0% 0.4% 3.0%
2011 -11.4% 0.1% 0.6% 0.7x -0.4x -1.4% -5.4% -7.9% -0.8% 2.6%
Sector
∆ 
Economic 
Return
Sales
CAGR
∆ EBITDA 
margin
Net Debt / 
EBITDA
(t+1)
Net Debt / 
EBITDA
(t-1)
Sales to 
Employe
e CAGR
Cost per 
Employe
e CAGR
∆ 
Overheads 
to Sales
∆ Capex 
to Sales
∆ WK to 
Sales
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing
-19.3% 8.0% -1.8% n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Mining & 
Construction
-5.8% 14.4% 3.6% -1.7x -0.8x 4.0% 7.5% -0.6% 1.7% -21.0%
Manufacturing -3.5% 3.2% 0.8% 0.0x 0.8x -1.7% -2.6% -0.3% 1.3% 3.0%
Transportation & 
Public Utilities
5.7% 10.7% 3.5% 2.0x -0.5x 4.5% -2.7% 3.7% -5.2% 5.7%
Wholesale Trade & 
Retail
-2.1% 13.7% -0.5% -0.6x -0.8x 2.8% 0.0% 1.5% 0.2% 4.1%
Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate
-6.1% -1.1% -5.6% -0.1x 0.0x -9.6% -7.2% -0.6% 5.7% -5.9%
Services -1.3% 7.9% -1.3% 0.3x 0.1x -3.7% -1.8% 3.5% 1.1% -1.6%
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5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests 
In this section we present the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the raw variables 
(table 8) and the variables adjusted by the performance of the peer group (table 9).  
Table 8 –Wilcoxon signed rank test (median values) – Raw variables 
Raw Variables Sample Median 
Statistic 
test 
∆ Economic Return 159 -2.2%* 1.91 
Sales CAGR 159 4.3%*** 3.80 
∆ EBITDA margin 159 -0.2% 0.90 
∆ Net Debt / EBITDA 145 0.2** 2.27 
Sales per Employee CAGR 119 2.0%** 2.31 
Cost per Employee CAGR 113 0.9%** 2.03 
∆ Overheads to Sales 154 3.3%*** 3.71 
∆ Intermediate costs to Sales 154 0.0% 0.97 
∆ Capex to Sales 151 -0.1% 1.39 
∆ WK to Sales 154 1.2% 0.45 
Note: ⁎⁎⁎: significant at the 1% level ⁎⁎: significant at the 5% level, ⁎: significant at the 10% level 
Table 9 – Wilcoxon signed rank test (median values) –industry adjusted variables 
Variables Sample 
Median 
(adjusted) 
Statistic 
test 
H1 - Do Buyouts create value?      
∆ Economic Return 157 -1.9% 0.98 
Test of Operating Performance     
Sales CAGR 158 6.9%*** 5.53 
∆ EBITDA margin 158 0.6% 0.46 
Test of Independent Variables     
∆ Net Debt / EBITDA 143 0.2* 1.72 
Sales per Employee CAGR 118 0.5% 0.71 
Cost per Employee CAGR 112 -1.8% 1.42 
∆ Overheads to Sales 152 2.0% 1.11 
∆ Intermediate costs to Sales 154 -6.7%*** 3.89 
∆ Capex to Sales 147 0.9%** 1.97 
∆ WK to Sales 152 1.5% 0.07 
Note: ⁎⁎⁎: significant at the 1% level ⁎⁎: significant at the 5% level, ⁎: significant at the 10% level 
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There are several results worth highlighting. 
First, at 10% significance level, economic returns in portfolio companies declined by 2.2 
percentage points three years after the deal. However, when adjusted by industry effects, 
there is no statistical evidence to support the idea that there is value destruction in 
portfolio companies after the buyout (p-value is significantly high at 0.33).  
Second, results from table 8 show a slightly positive increase in financial leverage 
(median of 0.2x increase in net debt / EBITDA) after the buyout. When adjusted for 
industry effects (table 9), portfolio companies still show a slight increase of financial 
leverage compared to the peer group (0.2x relative change in net debt / EBITDA) with 
the result being statistically significant on a 10% significance level. Note that since the 
relative change is quite low we cannot rule out that any potential deterioration of cash 
generation may have inflated this leverage ratio (rather than a deliberated increase of 
leverage through a typical LBO). Indeed, descriptive statistics suggest that debt to capital 
ratios and the weighted average cost of capital have not changed significantly both for 
portfolio companies and their respective peer group. Overall, these results are consistent 
with the common view that more recent waves of buyouts employ less financial leverage 
than their predecessors from the 1980s (e.g. Guo et al. (2011)). This evidence is far from 
being surprising, especially when our sample is highly skewed to the years of financial 
crisis with strong pressure to deleverage balance sheets. Indeed, looking at the descriptive 
statistics by buyout year (table 6) we see that leverage ratios tend to increase in the 
buyouts carried after the height of the sub-prime while the ones carried before 2008 
presented little increase in leverage or even reduction in leverage levels 
Third, portfolio companies have grown significantly faster than their peer groups (relative 
median sales CAGR of +6.9%). Indeed, the overall control sample has effectively shown 
declining revenues (median CAGR of -4.5%) while buyout companies posted a solid 
+4.3% annual growth. Note that this result is statistically significant at all levels.  
Forth, there is a significant increase in capital expenditure levels of buyouts when 
compared to their industry counterparts. With 5% significance level we observe that 
buyouts have increased in almost 100 basis points their capex to sales ratio relative to 
industry peers. These results are consistent with the study of Boucly et al. (2011) for 
French buyouts but inconsistent with several others. 
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Fifth, the results presented in the table 8 (raw data) show a significant increase in the level 
overheads suggesting that in some extent buyout companies may have boosted their sales 
growth thanks to relevant “Opex investments”. However, when adjusted by industry 
effects our results show that buyouts brought no significant changes in the level of 
overheads costs (table 9). These findings contrast with the common view that the 
promotion of a less bureaucratic organizational structure reflected in lower central 
overhead is one of the common measures by PE firms (e.g. Easterwood et al., 1989). Still, 
we acknowledge the imperfections of our overheads proxy (EBIT – Gross Profit) and that 
a more sophisticated approach to measure the fixed cost base may yield different 
conclusions.  
Sixth, we report a significant increase in the level of intermediate costs of portfolio 
companies when compared to the peer group. The relative decline in the ratio of 
intermediate costs in percentage of sales reached 6.7 percentage points. This magnitude 
appears to be high and statistically relevant at all levels of significance. 
Lastly, in contrast to the results of raw data, when adjusted for industry effects, there is 
no significant relative gains or losses of labour productivity and we have no evidence of 
a significant change in the relative cost per employee (this finding is consistent with the 
results of Bergström et al. (2007)). 
 
5.2 Do Buyouts create value?  
Results from the raw data in table 8 suggest that there is value destruction at portfolio 
companies. However, this result should be taken with caution given the time period used 
in our study (2006-11, highly impacted by the economic crisis) and a more accurate 
conclusion should take into account the performance of comparable companies in 
comparable conditions (table 9).  
As such, when adjusted by industry effects, there is no statistical evidence to support the 
idea that there is value destruction in portfolio companies after the buyout from PE firms. 
At least, a direct link between value creation and the PE investment is not significant 
under these results.  
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What we observe is that portfolio companies have indeed declined their economic return 
but this evolution was also shared by their respective industry counterparts and it is most 
likely explained by a more challenging macro environment during this period (rather than 
the PE investment per se). 
All in all, we do not found support for our main hypothesis that PE firms create value in 
portfolio companies: the evolution of industry adjusted economic returns earned by 
portfolio companies is not statistically significant.  
Furthermore, we found no evidence of a relative improvement or deterioration of 
operational performance as measured by the EBITDA margins (in both raw and industry 
adjusted statistics, the change in EBITDA margin is not statistically significant).  
These results contrast to the early findings of the 1980s (strong empirical evidence 
supporting the outperformance of buyouts) and are consistent with recent studies both for 
the US market (e.g. Guo et al. (2011)) and for Continental Europe (e.g. Scellato and 
Ughetto (2013)) showing non-conclusive findings of buyouts financial performance in 
more recent waves of deals.  
As a remark, we acknowledge that our findings may be impacted by the high volatility in 
economic performance (mostly reflected in high standard errors in our ROIC statistics) 
given the extreme macroeconomic conditions witnessed over the 2006-11 period.  
Hence, we highlight the importance of a continued study (probably with broader sample 
of deals and larger period) of pan-European buyouts carried over the past decade(s). 
 
5.3 Assessing the determinants of the buyouts’ value creation  
The results from our multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of buyouts value 
creation are shown in the table 10. Note that seven out of twelve explanatory variables 
have the expected sign: sales CAGR, leverage, labour, intermediate, working capital, 
independent and syndication. However, only the Sales CAGR, labour and intermediate 
variables have reasonable explanatory power in our OLS regressions. 
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Table 10 – Regression Analysis - Determinants of value creation in buyouts 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Industry adjusted variables 
(Model I) 
Non adjusted variables 
(Model II) 
I II III IV V VI 
Constant n.a. 
-0.07** -0.07** -0.11 -0.31** -0.28 -0.32 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.133) (0.119) (0.233) (0.238) 
Sales CAGR + 
0.51** 0.5** 0.95** 0.69*** 0.74** 0.83** 
(0.213) (0.237) (0.388) (0.243) (0.338) (0.402) 
Leverage + 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Labour + 
0.37* 0.41* 0.43 0.39 0.50 0.46 
(0.22) (0.244) (0.371) (0.252) (0.321) (0.396) 
Wage - 
 -0.16 -0.32   -0.66 
  (0.267) (0.425)     (0.561) 
Overheads - 
 0.04 0.20 0.19* 0.16 0.20 
  (0.194) (0.262) (0.103) (0.15) (0.157) 
Intermediate - 
-0.08* -0.08* -0.1*** -0.10 -0.20 -0.21 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.035) (0.101) (0.137) (0.148) 
Capex - 
  -0.05   0.05 
    (0.283)     (0.31) 
WK - 
  -0.01   -0.02 
    (0.072)     (0.075) 
Country + 
  -0.06  -0.10 -0.08 
    (0.09)   (0.092) (0.1) 
Independent + 
  0.02  0.03 0.01 
    (0.072)   (0.078) (0.081) 
Syndication + 
  0.10  0.13 0.16* 
    (0.087)   (0.086) (0.086) 
Portfolio + 
  -0.01  -0.05 -0.05 
    (0.047)   (0.045) (0.046) 
Industry dummies  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size  110 107 69 112 75 71 
R-squared  0.22 0.20 0.32 0.32 0.42 0.41 
Adjusted R-squared  0.19 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.26 0.19 
Prob (F-statistic)   0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 
 
The table reports the results of OLS regressions for the sample of buyouts and the respective peer group. For the sake 
of synthesis we omit estimated coefficients o industry dummies. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ⁎⁎⁎: significant at the 1% level ⁎⁎: significant at the 5% level, ⁎: significant at the 10% level. 
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5.3.1 Financial leverage 
Although financial debt is often seen as a powerful disciplinary instrument, the univariate 
analysis showed that the relative increase of financial leverage in buyout companies is 
not particularly strong. Furthermore, our regression analysis presented in table 10 shows 
no evidence that an increase of financial leverage leads to a superior economic 
performance, contrarily to the argument of the disciplinary effect of debt on the 
management. These results  are consistent with the findings of other studies (e.g. 
Bergström et al. (2007), Holthausen and Larcker (1996), Thomson et al. (1992), Vinten 
(2007)).  
Overall, our results support the idea that although the capital structure may act as a real 
instrument of corporate governance, there are some adverse consequences of financial 
leverage that may ultimately offset its benefits. Many authors advanced with the 
hypothesis that too much leverage may promote a short-term oriented management (given 
the likelihood of financial distress) and a decline in competitiveness (e.g., Palepu, 1990). 
In addition, high financial leverage may lead to project selection problems due to 
managerial risk aversion (Holthausen and Larcker, 1996). 
5.3.2 Growth, Capex and the Entrepreneurial mind-set 
Results from the regression analysis (table 10) provide strong evidence that buyout 
companies that show a stronger pace of growth create more value, suggesting that a 100pp 
increase of annual sales growth (relative to the industry) leads to an increase of economic 
returns between 20 to 40pp. 
In addition, note that our univariate analysis reported a significant increase in capital 
expenditure levels of buyouts when compared to industry counterparts. Overall, the 
higher pace of growth combined with a relative increase of capex levels give some 
support to the argument that PE investors bring entrepreneurial and growth mind-set to 
portfolio companies (e.g. Berg and Gottschalg, 2005). Taken together, these results 
suggest that rather than a straightforward spending cut, the key step taken by PE firms is 
to withdraw resources from low profitable projects and allocate capital to more value 
creative projects even if it means increasing the level of capex.  
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However, we highlight that the results from our regression analysis do not provide 
evidence that changes in capex influence the economic returns of portfolio companies. 
On the other hand, we suspect the higher sales growth and capex levels might be related 
to a more aggressive acquisitive policy of buyout companies thanks to “buy and build” 
strategies promoted by PE firms (even if the impact of large, transforming acquisitions 
should have been offset by the use of medians instead of averages). Indeed, since our 
capex figures were computed from the changes of tangible fixed assets and other 
intangibles (including goodwill), the relative increase of capex might very well translate 
higher levels of acquisitions (in percentage of sales) when compared to industry peers.  
In any case, and given that margins do not show significant change relative to the peer 
group (neither working capital levels), this higher pace of growth seems to have been 
achieved at the expense of higher invested capital as well (including goodwill) and 
ultimately translated in neutral value creation compared to non-buyout compares. 
Naturally, a proper assessment of value creation in this case would require a higher time 
period to assess the mid to long-term impact and consequent value of the projects 
unlocked by such investments (not reflected in the first 3 years).  
5.3.3 Outsourcing and Labour Productivity 
Despite our univariate analysis reported no significant gains or losses of labour 
productivity after adjusting for industry effects (table 9), we found considerable evidence 
that an increase of labour productivity (measured by the sales per employee ratio) 
contributes positively to economic returns (table 10). Our regression results imply that a 
1 percentage point increase of sales per employee leads to an increase in economic returns 
of around 0.4 percentage points.  
In addition, we report considerable evidence that higher outsourcing has a positive 
contribution for value creation. More specifically, our results imply that a reduction of 1 
percentage point in intermediate consumption (in percentage of sales) leads to a relative 
increase of around 0.1 percentage points in economic returns.  
Combined with the outcome from our univariate analysis (i.e. that buyout companies tend 
to outsource more and decrease significantly their intermediate costs when compared to 
industry peers) these results suggest some kind of trade-off between internal and external 
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resources and are consistent with the argument that portfolio companies achieve higher 
operating performance by reducing the labour intensity through the outsourcing of 
intermediate goods and materials (Harris et al., 2005). 
5.3.4 Employees’ Remuneration 
We found no evidence that changes in the wage levels affect the economic returns of 
portfolio companies. Combined with the results of our univariate analysis that buyouts do 
not have a significant impact on wages (consistent with the results reported by Bergström 
et al. (2007)) our findings go against the frequent political and unions’ arguments that 
private equity investments generate returns through the value expropriation from 
employees. At least, there is no evidence that value is created through wage cuts. 
However, it is worth noting that the introduction of buyouts usually bring an adjustment 
on employees’ remuneration, meaning in the most of the cases the design of ownership 
schemes and performance-based payments which, in part, substitute the traditional salary. 
As such, it is difficult to draw firm inferences regarding the buyout effect on wages 
(Wright et al., 2012). 
5.3.5 Other findings 
We found no significant impact of buyouts on working capital levels neither a significant 
relationship with value creation. These results are consistent with the finding of Guo et 
al. (2011) which found no significant changes in the net working capital to sales ratio.  
Additionally, the relationship between the level of overheads and value creation is very 
weak being only significant at 10% level in regression IV. 
Looking at the private equity firm related dummy variables, only the one related to 
syndicated deals provided meaningful results (statistically significant in the regression 
VI) with a positive coefficient (as expected). All the other dummies related to the 
independency, localization and experience (portfolio) of PE firms show no explanatory 
power at all. 
Lastly, the results of the regressions using non-adjusted variables with industry dummies 
show positive and significant coefficients for some industries, namely general 
manufacturing, business services and transportation & public utilities. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this study we fill in the actual research gap on the value creation of private equity 
buyouts at portfolio companies with most of the existing empirical research being focused 
on the post-buyout operating performance without taking into account the potential 
change in the capital structure of acquired companies. We analysed a sample of 159 pan-
European buyouts during the 2006-2011 period using an economic value added approach 
comparing the relative change of economic returns defined as the excess returns over the 
cost of capital. Our main result is that, when adjusted by industry effects, there is no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that private equity buyouts create value in portfolio 
companies. We acknowledge that our findings may be distorted by an extreme 
macroeconomic environment in this period, highlighting the importance of further 
empirical work using a larger period and a broader sample of deals. We also recognize 
that our methodology implied important assumptions (namely in the definition of the cost 
of capital) encouraging alternative approaches in future research. 
We have also applied a regression analysis to study the potential determinants of the 
buyouts’ value creation. We found no evidence that an increase of financial leverage leads 
to superior economic performance, contrarily to the argument of the disciplinary effect of 
debt on the management. We also found some support to the argument that private equity 
investment bring an entrepreneurial and growth mind-set to the acquired companies, 
reflected in a higher pace of growth and capex intensity levels. However, if the higher 
sales growth seem to contribute positively to economic returns the same cannot be said 
regarding the changes in capex. Furthermore, our results suggest that value can be created 
in portfolio companies if they reduce their labour intensity through the higher outsourcing 
of intermediate goods and services. Lastly, this study provided no significant evidence to 
the arguments that a higher economic performance can be achieved through the reduction 
of wages, overheads or working capital.  
In the end, our results highlight the complexity of the value creation process reflected in 
the challenging identification and quantification of explanatory variables when the 
process itself may be better explained by qualitative variables able to reproduce, for 
instance, new and different strategies implemented by the private equity firm. 
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